The Chinese Dream

From the fourth poorest country in the world to the vision of a high-tech eco-civilization

Image: Fumiko, Wikimedia Commons

In 1931, James Truslow Adams coined the term “the American Dream”, a “dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to his ability or achievement.”^[1] Almost a century later, this dream has faded for most US citizens. An impoverished working class and a declining middle class, endless wars and deep political division characterize the land of once-unlimited opportunity. Other Western countries have also been swept into the maelstrom of decline: the UK, Italy, France and now Germany too are marked by advancing de-industrialization and growing political bitterness amongst large sections of the population. Meanwhile, a country that was among the four poorest nations on Earth just 50 years ago has experienced a spectacular rise: China. Since the 2010s, President Xi Jinping has been speaking of the ‘Chinese Dream’ in a blunt appropriation of the US myth. In the West, fears of an overpowering China are rife. The European Union has declared the country a “systemic rival” while the US has been trying to pivot to Asia for a long time to contain China’s rise, which is considered the main challenge to US hegemony.

Overcoming mass poverty

Economically speaking, the developments of the past 40 years are not only impressive, but unprecedented in human history in terms of scale and speed. China is now responsible for around a third of global industrial output. It manufactures more products than all the G7 countries combined (the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Canada). According to the World Bank, 800 million people have been lifted out of absolute poverty and have now achieved a modest level of prosperity – the most successful poverty reduction program in history.^[2] Most of them now live in cities. Anyone traveling through this once predominantly agricultural country today will be overwhelmed by the number and scale of the skyscraper cities that have sprung up everywhere like mushrooms over the last few decades. When traveling through China on high-speed trains – at a constant 350 kilometers per hour – barely a few minutes pass without the outlines of new concrete cities.

Zhengzhou, once a modest provincial capital with a few hundred thousand inhabitants, now has 12 million residents – roughly the size of the Los Angeles metropolitan area area. A network of urban motorways and ten-lane roads winds its way through seemingly endless skyscraper districts. It was here, in the factories of electronics giant Foxconn, that a large proportion of Apple’s smartphones were manufactured, the city is popularly known as ‘iPhone City’. Foxconn has since relocated some of its production capacity to other sites. In its place, the car manufacturer BYD is building the world’s largest car factory, covering an area the size of San Francisco. The Tesla Gigafactory in Texas could fit ten times over this area. A new vehicle rolls off the production line here every four seconds; in a few years’ time, a car is set to leave the factory every second.

All vehicles manufactured in Zhengzhou are electric cars. The cheapest models are available in China for around $11,000 – and are significantly superior to comparable Western models, which cost three to four times as much. A full charge of a BYD battery now takes less than ten minutes – compared to half an hour at best for a VW. The German automotive industry, which has long failed to keep pace with the trend towards e-mobility, is lagging significantly behind and is currently plunging into a deep crisis with mass lay-offs. The EU and the US have responded with tariffs to protect their domestic markets. But this means that electric cars remain excessively expensive on both sides of the Atlantic. The inevitable modernization of mobility is further delayed, and the West falls even more behind.

China’s arduous path to modernity

China’s explosive rise has a long and rocky history, which began with a catastrophic decline. Well into the 17th and 18th centuries, the Middle Kingdom was superior to Europe in many respects. China needed hardly any products from the West; it produced almost everything itself and to a higher standard: textiles, glass, ceramics, ships, and infrastructure such as the famous irrigation canals. Consequently, the West’s trade balance with China was negative for centuries – as it is again today. Yet the emperors of the Qing Dynasty and their bureaucratic state missed the boat of industrialization taking place in Europe. When Britain then invaded China in the First Opium War of 1839 with its coal-powered gunboats, the government in Beijing had little to set against the Europeans. The consequences of this and subsequent invasions plunged the country into chaos. Forced by the so-called “unequal treaties” to open up to Western trading companies, missionaries and drugs, the Middle Kingdom sank increasingly into civil wars and crime.

Unfortunately, we learn little or nothing at school about this chapter of history. For the Chinese, the period from the First Opium War to the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 is deeply etched into the collective memory as the ‘Century of Humiliation’. Never again, so goes the credo today, must China surrender itself to foreign powers. It must be economically and militarily strong enough to withstand renewed invasions. China’s resurgence as a world power is therefore also seen as a form of life insurance.

The founding of the People’s Republic put an end to civil wars, economic plunder and interference by foreign states. Yet the path to modernity was a long one. In 1955, Mao proclaimed the ‘Great Leap Forward’: through decentralized iron production, the aim was to overtake Britain in metal production within a few years. The result, however, was a disaster: not only was the iron largely unusable, but the peasants had also neglected their crops during a period of drought, resulting in a devastating famine. In 1963, Premier Zhou Enlai announced “four modernizations” in agriculture, industry, defense and science. But the “Cultural Revolution” (1966–76), set in motion by Mao and his wife Jiang Qing, plunged the country again into chaos and set it back economically.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics

It was not until Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 that a far-reaching policy of reform and opening up was initiated, which was to propel the country into a new era. To this end, Deng introduced the concept of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, which remains central to China’s core strategies to this day. Whilst all land remained in state ownership, agriculture was partially privatized: Each farming family was now responsible for its own profits and losses, which significantly boosted productivity. At the same time, so-called Special Economic Zones were created to attract foreign direct investment. One of these was the fishing village of Shenzhen, near Hong Kong. Today, the city has a population of 17 million and is regarded as the new Silicon Valley, which could soon overtake its Californian counterpart.

Deng’s reforms opened a Pandora’s box. Through the privatization of state-owned enterprises, some who had good friends in government became millionaires overnight, and some even billionaires. Meanwhile, workers toiled for up to 16 hours a day in the special economic zones for a pittance, manufacturing shoes, clothing and electronics – largely for Western corporations such as Nike or Apple, which were thereby able to multiply their profit margins. Whilst per capita gross domestic product grew 48-fold over the following decades, the gap between rich and poor widened dramatically at the same time. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” increasingly resembled capitalism with a socialist veneer. The student-led protest movement of 1989, which was brutally suppressed, was directed not least against the negative excesses of this policy.

Inhumane working conditions were still widespread in the 2000s. The iPhone manufacturer Foxconn, for example – whose headquarters are not in the People’s Republic but in Taiwan – caused a scandal in 2010 following a series of suicides due to appalling working conditions.

However, the situation changed noticeably when the current President, Xi Jinping, assumed key positions of power in 2012. Xi proclaimed a policy of ‘shared prosperity’ designed to strengthen the middle class. According to the World Bank, the so-called Gini coefficient, which measures inequality in society, fell significantly in the following years.^[3] Although most Chinese people still work long and hard today, the legal framework has improved. The 40-hour working week now applies throughout China.

The primacy of the state over capital

In 2019, Jack Ma, the billionaire head of the Alibaba Group – the Chinese equivalent of Amazon – vociferously promoted the so-called 996 model: Chinese people should work every day from 9 am to 9 pm, six days a week. This program was a massive attack on the government’s plans. For reasons not yet disclosed, Ma withdrew from the public eye shortly afterwards. Insiders suspect that the government pressured him to do so because he had crossed red lines.

The fact that the government has reined in the powerful Alibaba executive is typical of the relationship between the state and big business in China. This has been the case since well before the founding of the People’s Republic. Even in dynastic times, the emperors and their officials sought to prevent the power of merchants from growing to such an extent that it could undermine state authority. This is also reflected by the Confucian state ideology, which once again plays a major role in China today.

The fact that China was able to change course after the turbo-capitalist excesses of the Deng era to embed the common good more firmly into policies was only possible because the state had never relinquished control over the key sectors of land, banking, energy and infrastructure. This allows the government to engage in long-term planning and to implement strategic decisions – unlike in the West, where, as a result of extensive privatization, states and societies have become pawns of the financial markets.

The project of an ecological civilization

The rampant industrialization of the Deng era had also plunged China into an environmental disaster of epic proportions: polluted rivers, poisoned soil, contaminated groundwater, high greenhouse gas emissions and thick smog in the cities were a heavy price to pay for rapid development. Yet under Xi’s leadership – sometimes referred to as “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 3.0” – a turning point was reached. From 2012 onwards, the project of an ‘ecological civilization’ was proclaimed as a central state objective.^[4] “Blue waters and green mountains are silver and gold,” the President is quoted as saying. Even though, in the face of megacities, concrete deserts, gigantic shopping malls and motorway jungles, the question arises as to how such a civilization could ever become ecological, there are tangible successes to report.

China is now a global leader in the field of reforestation.^[5] A quarter of the land reforested worldwide over the past 20 years is in China. The so-called “Green Wall” in the north of the country, designed to protect Beijing from the encroaching Gobi Desert, is the largest reforestation project in human history. To date, around 80 billion trees have been planted there, covering an area the size of the United Kingdom.^[6] However, environmentalists point out that the planting of fast-growing poplars and firs also has negative consequences for the water table and biodiversity. Despite these problems, desertification has been effectively curbed and one of the world’s largest new carbon sinks has been created.

In the cities, too, greening enjoys a high political priority. The wide boulevards with ten, twelve or even 16 lanes, typical of the modern Chinese cities, have been lined with several rows of trees almost everywhere, which not only significantly improves the urban climate but also the aesthetics of these cities. In urban planning, large public parks are generally incorporated as green corridors. Green spaces are also maintained at great expense. In Beijing and other cities, tankers are out at night to water every single tree.

Whilst 20 years ago the world’s most polluted cities were in China, the air in Beijing and other major cities is now largely clear. The Law on the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution has introduced strict limits for industry and power stations.^[7] Electric cars dominate the roads, easily recognizable by their green number plates. As for motorized two-wheelers, only e-scooters are permitted. This not only cleans the air, but also makes the cities considerably quieter. Both the central government and local authorities are very effectively promoting a rapid transition to e-mobility. In chronically congested Shanghai, with its 25 million inhabitants, for example, you have to wait years to register a combustion engine vehicle and pay around €10,000, whereas registering an electric car is possible immediately and at no extra cost.

Electricity in China is not only significantly cheaper than petrol – a kilowatt-hour costs a third of the price in Germany – but it is also increasingly sourced from renewable energy sources. Although China is still building new coal-fired power stations, it is simultaneously constructing vast solar and wind farms, particularly in the vast expanses of the sparsely populated Chinese west, where sun and wind are in abundance. As both the energy and banking sectors are still predominantly state-owned, financing and implementation can be politically steered and accelerated. This also applies to local projects such as the installation of solar panels on rooftops. Whilst in Europe and the US feed-in tariffs and guidelines change with every change of government – which poses considerable risks for homeowners – in China the state assumes all risk. Where solar installations make sense in local communities, the government funds the construction; users pay nothing, they must only feed a portion of the electricity into the grid. This means there is virtually no reason to resist the change. Therefore, there are no signs of cultural wars over energy like in Europe or the US.

Overall, China has doubled its investment in renewable energy since 2015 to 625 billion US dollars per year.^[8] That is three times as much as all EU member states invest in this sector.^[9] The goal: a largely electrified and solar-based economy by 2060. The Chinese government is not solely concerned with environmental targets, but also with rapidly reducing its dependence on oil and gas. The war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have once again demonstrated how dangerous this dependence is.

Today, China can produce everything it needs in all key industries – with the exception of the fastest high-performance processors, where the US manufacturer NVIDIA still has the edge. If the Middle Kingdom also becomes largely independent in energy production, it will further insulate itself from geopolitical risks. The EU, on the other hand, remains tied for the foreseeable future to dirty, overpriced and highly volatile oil and gas supplies from the US and the Gulf states, due to its strategically haphazard energy policy. The US as well remains addicted to a finite energy source.

The price of progress

Amid all positive developments, however, there are also downsides of China’s rise. China is now a meritocracy with enormous competitive pressure. In Shanghai – China’s most expensive city – a flat now costs 8 million yuan – around one million dollars. Even with a salary of around 2,000 dollars a month – which is very good by Chinese standards – this is barely affordable. If you do manage it, it is only, as people say in Shanghai, as a lifelong ‘slave to the banks’. Anyone wishing to marry usually has to prove they own a flat and a car. The result is that many Chinese find themselves caught in an exhausting rat race just to start and support a family – with both husband and wife usually working. Anyone who, after a long, hard day in a windowless factory, arrives at the 24th floor of their concrete fortress after a journey of up to two hours, often barely manages to switch on the television. The Chinese Dream can have a very bleak face in reality. It is in this respect no different from the American Dream of yesteryear, whose dark side Arthur Miller immortalized as early as 1949 in his play “Death of a Salesman”.

Social alienation and loneliness are a major problem in today’s China. In the space of a few decades, 75 per cent of the rural population – around 600 million people – have moved to the cities to work in industry. Whilst this has overcome extreme poverty, it has simultaneously shattered the network of neighborly relationships that existed in the village. A resident of Shanghai reported wistfully that in distant Chengdu, in Sichuan province, one can still occasionally see people playing cards on the street – a phenomenon that has largely disappeared on the east coast. Social contact has been replaced by consumerism – or just the dream of it. Shanghai’s famous shopping mile on Nanjing Road may well surpass in scale most things we know in the West, and lacks nothing from Prada to Gucci. Yet only a relatively small wealthy class can afford this.

The race for a chance at social mobility begins as early as nursery school. The pressure then increases further at school, especially if one is aiming for a top-tier degree. Of the country’s 3,000 or so higher education institutions, around a hundred are regarded as top universities that guarantee good jobs. Nine of them belong to the elite C9 League. But the bar is set extremely high for admission. Many sixth-form students work a seven-day week, studying for up to twelve hours a day. When the regular school day, which begins between seven and eight in the morning, ends at 5 or 6 pm, homework follows, sometimes lasting until midnight. At the weekend, private tuition is the order of the day.

This intense pressure to perform often carries over into working life, leaving little room for recreation, family and friendships. One of the consequences is a rise in mental health conditions. According to WHO figures, 54 million people in China suffer from depression and 41 million from anxiety disorders.^[10] In Western countries, the figures are in some cases significantly higher, but China is catching up here too.

Systemic rival or partner?

Whilst European and American companies benefited for decades from cheap wages in China and governments courted China accordingly, the tide has now turned. China is increasingly being portrayed as a threat. The reason is simple: the country no longer produces primarily for Western corporations, but rather high-quality products of its own, against which many a Western company can barely compete in a free market. Whilst the West helped facilitate China’s rise through technology transfer, it now struggles with the consequences. The preaching of the free market, which dominated the economic policies of the US and the EU for decades, has given way to a new protectionism.

Frustration over their the relative decline of the West has also manifested itself in recent years in diplomatically unhelpful remarks, such as when German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock described President Xi as a “dictator”, just as Joe Biden had done before her.

To be sure: China is not a democracy, even if elections do take place at local level and within party and parliamentary structures. The system can be understood rather as an expertocracy than as a dictatorship: at all levels, from local to national, experiences are evaluated and fed into the decision-making bodies of the party and government, whose resolutions are in turn scrutinized in detail by committees of the People’s Congress. This is what makes China so adaptable and efficient in practical matters.

At the same time, however, there is a great fear of opening up at the ideological level. A free press is not existing in China. Most media outlets are state-run; the few private ones know their limits all too well. Journalists admit this quite openly. The general thrust is: first and foremost, spread good news that serves the grand narrative of the country’s rise. Accordingly, the roughly 20 channels of the state-run television broadcaster CCTV mainly feature nature films, interviews with successful entrepreneurs and state-affiliated experts, grand heroic epics about the victory over the Japanese occupiers, and, increasingly, historical films set in the imperial era.

The restrictions on freedom of expression are undoubtedly one of the less attractive aspects of China. But does this pose a serious threat to the West? That would only be the case if China were to develop the intention and the capability to impose its system on the world by force. Such fantasies are occasionally heard in the US. Yet this view is usually shaped by a lack of knowledge of Chinese history. There is no doubt that China wishes to regain its former greatness; this is evident everywhere. Anyone visiting, for instance, the reconstructed Empress’s Palace in the former capital Luoyang experiences an overwhelming display of splendor and grandeur. But this grandeur was not, and is not, founded on global domination, as was the case with the Western claim to hegemony over the centuries. China has never built a colonial empire, although it would have had the means to do so. After all, it once possessed by far the largest fleet in the world and had access to black powder centuries before the Europeans. The Middle Kingdom relied on strength through trade, not on military conquest of the world. Most wars were fought to secure the border regions.

Today, the central security concern of the Chinese leadership is to avoid a repeat of foreign interference such as that seen during the ‘Century of Humiliation’. Never again should China be vulnerable to blackmail; never again should foreign troops set foot on Chinese soil. According to the Chinese understanding, this also includes Taiwan, which has been recognized as part of China by the United Nations, the US and all European countries since the 1970s.

A rational foreign policy would do well to understand China’s history and respect its security interests. This is a crucial prerequisite for a peaceful transition to a multi-polar world order.

This article was first published in German by the Berliner Zeitung.

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^[1] James Truslow Adams: Epic of America, 1931

^[2] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/01/lifting-800-million-people-out-of-poverty-new-report-looks-at-lessons-from-china-s-experience

^[3] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=CN

^[4] UNEP: Green is gold: The strategy and actions of China’s ecological civilisation, https://reliefweb.int/report/china/green-gold-strategy-and-actions-chinas-ecological-civilization

^[5] https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-025-02323-z

^[6] https://www.futura-sciences.com/en/china-planted-78-billion-trees-and-seriously-messed-up-its-water-cycle_32327/

^[7] https://www.iea.org/policies/11896-law-on-air-pollution-prevention-and-control

^[8] https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2025/china

^[9] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/funding-and-financing/clean-energy-investment_en

^[10] https://www.who.int/china/health-topics/mental-health